Security expert and MP Jarno Limnell recently raised the alarm over a noticeable shift in Moscow’s official communications: Russia has systematically intensified its propaganda machine against Finland. What we are witnessing is not diplomatic grumbling over NATO accession. It is a deliberate, multi-layered information operation designed to shape perceptions across three entirely different audiences.
As propaganda ran along these exact same tracks against Ukraine in 2021, the intent here is clear: either Moscow is preparing its domestic population for a future conflict with Finland—as Finland is now explicitly in their crosshairs—or this is maskirovka, designed to draw eyes north while the actual hammer falls in the Baltics. Time will tell.
To understand this campaign, we must cut through the noise, look at what is being claimed, analyze why it is being pushed to specific groups, and counter it with cold, hard facts.
The Official Kremlin Narrative: Framing Defense as Aggression
Official Russian state outlets—from TASS and RIA Novosti to state-controlled television—have aggressively escalated their attack rhetoric against Finland. The core of their strategy relies on two fundamentally dishonest claims—a classic run from the Soviet-style playbook: accuse the other side of what you are actually doing yourself.
First, Moscow actively frames routine Finnish military readiness as an impending threat. Transparent Finnish Defense Forces exercises, such as brigade-level artillery or infantry drills in Niinisalo, are routinely portrayed by Russian commentators as offensive rehearsals targeting the Russian border. Similarly, Finnish investments in domestic ammunition production and defensive arms exports are spun as direct participation in offensive strike capabilities aimed at Russian territory.
Second, the Kremlin pushes a narrative of historical revanchism and lost sovereignty. State-aligned commentators regularly claim that Finland’s integration into NATO has stripped the country of its independence, reducing it to a military pawn occupied by Washington and Brussels. To bolster this, state media has reactivated historical grievances, periodically alleging that Finnish political elites harbor revanchist ambitions to reclaim lost territories in Karelia.
My family is originally from Karelia, so I would be happy to see Karelia back in the Fatherland, and I’m not averse to killing my own 10 invading russkies, but this sentiment can hardly be a basis of foreign policy in Finland.
The Internal Audience: Consolidating the Siege Mentality
Inside Russia, this messaging serves a precise domestic purpose. The Kremlin relies on maintaining a persistent siege mentality to justify its foreign aggression, economic sacrifices, and internal repression.
By portraying Finland as a newly minted frontline threat, Moscow justifies its own militarization along the northwestern border. State television broadcasts images of Finnish border infrastructure alongside NATO exercise footage to convince Russian citizens that a military build-up near Karelia is a vital defensive response to Finnish hostility.
Furthermore, this narrative enables moral transference. By depicting NATO’s northern flank as an aggressive staging ground, Russia rebrands its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine as a necessary pre-emptive war against an expanding Western alliance. Legislative maneuvers—such as newly proposed Russian laws claiming extraterritorial military rights to “protect Russian citizens abroad”—are presented to the domestic public as legal duties rather than tools for future intimidation.
The Finnish Target: Injecting Fear and Eroding Trust
When directed at Finland, Moscow’s messaging drops the pretense of domestic justification and shifts entirely to psychological warfare. The primary objective within Finnish society is to generate friction, anxiety, and distrust. This strategy deliberately feeds on the knee-jerk fear of older generations who have failed to realize the steep, systemic decline of the Russian state since the 1980s.
The Kremlin’s chief instrument against a target population is fear—specifically when people fail to recognize that fear itself is the weapon. This is known in the Soviet playbook as Reflexive Control: where the target reflexively starts backing out of options the Kremlin warns against.
Coordinated bot networks, the St. Petersburg “Troll Factory,” and state-backed commentators flood digital platforms under defense news, warning that Finland’s alignment with Western security frameworks will inevitably turn Finnish cities into targets for Russian missile strikes. Sometimes these “personas” are pretty good, but usually their legends don’t stand up even to casual scrutiny. There is an expression in Finnish, “ryssiä”, which refers to the Russian way of royally fucking up in an easily foreseen but spectacular way.
Alongside fear, the operation seeks to erode trust in national institutions. Russian signaling—ranging from orchestrated border disruptions to legal threats—aims to force Finnish leadership into a reactive posture while sowing doubt among the public regarding the government, military leadership, and mainstream media. The goal is simple: fracture national cohesion from within.
The Western Alternative Scene: Exploiting Anti-Establishment Pockets
Beyond Finland and Russia, Moscow exports tailored variations of these narratives to alternative, anti-establishment, and politically radical circles across the United States and Western Europe.
In these spaces, the Kremlin reframes Finland’s NATO membership not as a sovereign national choice driven by Russia’s invasion of a peaceful neighbor, but as forced “NATO expansionism” driven by Washington hawks. Social media campaigns across platforms like X and Telegram pump talking points to fringe commentators, alleging that the West forced Finland to abandon decades of successful neutrality purely to provoke Moscow.
Additionally, Russian information streams target Western anti-war and isolationist groups by amplifying claims that Nordic arms production and defense aid are dragging ordinary European and American citizens into an unwanted third world war. By feeding these narratives to the fringe, Moscow attempts to drive a wedge between Western allies and weaken collective defense resolve.
Countering the Propaganda: Reality vs. Kremlin Fantasy
Dismantling Kremlin disinformation does not require complex counter-narratives; it requires stating reality plainly and firmly.
Finland’s military posture is strictly defensive. Every exercise, procurement program, and alliance integration step serves a single purpose: deterrence and national defense. Finland poses zero aggressive threat to any nation that respects sovereign borders and international law. Preparing to defend one’s home is not a provocation.
Finally, Finnish society operates on high institutional trust, comprehensive security, and deep resilience. Recognizing propaganda for what it is—a cheap, desperate psychological tactic—completely strips it of its power. Finland will not be intimidated into panic, nor will it ignore security realities. We remain vigilant, clear-eyed, and prepared.
Reference Links / Lähteet:
- Verkkouutiset: Venäjä väittää Suomen valmistautuvan hyökkäykseen – ”Kremlin propaganda ei muuta faktoja”
- Verkkouutiset: Venäjä ylläpitää aktiivisesti tarinaa suomalaisesta revansismista
- Verkkouutiset: Venäjän Suomi-narratiivi muuttuu – ”psykologinen paine kasvaa”
- Verkkouutiset: Jarno Limnell: Tämä on turvallisuuspoliittinen viesti Suomelle
- Verkkouutiset: Kansanedustaja: Tätä Venäjän uusi laki tarkoittaisi Suomelle
