I found an interesting piece in National Interest. Link to original HERE. This covers Finnish position in North-European gameboard exactly. In Finland there is childlike believe that Finland can stay out of any future NATO-Russia confrontation, even though both parties in conflict would like to use Finnish sea- and airspace in their operations. So BEST we can hope for is guarded neutrality with extreme prejudice.
The famously neutral nation fears Russian aggression. Michael Peck August 28, 2016
“Finlandization” is the term for a small nation, located next to a much bigger nation, that maintains a foreign policy of careful neutrality. In return, its bigger neighbor doesn’t crush it.
Can you guess which country Finlandization is named after? Good guess! Having your country become a synonym for neutrality isn’t exactly a compliment, but if national survival is a worthy achievement, then Finlandization has worked for Finland for almost a century. Despite being on Russia’s northern border and losing two wars with the Soviet Union in 1939–40 and 1941–44, Finland has remained independent and democratic.
No, Finland could not join NATO (nor did it even join the European Union until 1995, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.) Yet even if its choices were constrained by the Muscovite behemoth to the south, at least Finland had a freedom of choice that the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians could only envy during the Cold War.
But is Finland about to abandon neutrality and become America’s newest Nordic ally?
Finnish Defense Minister Jussi Niinisto told Reuters on Monday that his nation is negotiating a defense agreement with the United States. Niinisto expects the agreement to be signed by this fall.
Niinisto said the agreement would not include any military obligations for either nation. “It would cover areas where we already work together, like military training, information sharing and research,” he told Reuters.
Sweden—also another Scandinavian bastion of neutrality—signed a similar agreement with the United States in June for collaboration on antisubmarine and antiair warfare. Both Finland and Sweden attended a NATO summit meeting in July. Though it’s worth pointing out that unlike Finland, Sweden doesn’t share a border with Russia, hasn’t fought a war with Russia since 1809, and never appeared on any atlas as a part of the Tsarist Empire.
Predictably, Russian President Vladimir Putin responded that if Finland joined NATO, he would move troops to the Finnish-Russian border. “Do you think we will continue to act in the same manner [if Finland joins NATO]? We have withdrawn our troops 1,500 [kilometers from the border]. Do you think they will stay there?” he asked reporters. No, we don’t expect Russian troops to stay where they are. We do expect them to move closer to the Finnish border, but not cross it. Grabbing Crimea from Ukraine, or supporting a disgruntled Russian minority in eastern Ukraine, is one thing. Invading or destabilizing Finland is something else.
This 1500km from the border had a life of it’s own. There was much debate about WHAT did mister P. mean with this 1500km from border? Because Alakurtti is something about 50km from border. So are various places in Karelian peninsula and Kola. Also St. Petersburg and Pskov and Kaliningrad are within the 1500km circle. Of course there was a much debate about could mr P. lie deliberately? or had he the facts wrong? Appeasers were of course ready to believe Putin, and were ready to condemn naysayers for damaging relationships to foreign power. I could not really believe what I read and heard. Epämuodikkaitaajatuksia on 31.8.2016
Which raises the question: why is Finland seeking closer military ties with the West?
The obvious answer is that Finland and Sweden are worried. Russian intervention in Ukraine, Moscow’s rumblings toward the Baltic states, and Russian violations of Finnish and Swedish airspace have them on edge.
I contacted Mika Aaltola, who directs the Global Security program at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Aaltola says that while Finns “have a deep distrust that formal alliances work,” the Finnish government is interested in a bilateral relationship with the United States because of an “acute awareness that national interests match. This is thought to be a very solid basis for a deepening partnership.”
From the U.S. perspective, Sweden, and to a lesser extent Finland, are needed to defend the Baltic states from Russia. “What is needed from Finland, is for Finland to be able to stop the Russian use of its airspace and maritime areas to support military incursions into the Baltic,” Aaltola says. For the Finns, the incentive for closer ties with the Americans is the need to secure its trade routes. “Finnish arteries are along the Baltic sea,” he adds.
However, Aaltola doesn’t see this as “so much a step towards NATO, although it might be that Finland will join in five to ten years. It is more a move to consolidate the Finnish position.”
Nonetheless, the question still remains as to what Finland will get out of antagonizing Russia. Unlike Finland, America doesn’t share an 800-mile-long border with a nuclear-armed and somewhat touchy former superpower. Closer ties with the West haven’t saved Ukraine, and it’s debatable whether they’ll save the Baltic states. Would the United States or NATO commit aircraft or ships—let alone ground troops—to Finland’s defense? And under what circumstances, given that Russia has mastered the art of attacking or threatening its neighbors through means short of outright war? Even Sweden, which sent volunteers and supplies to aid the Finns in the Winter War of 1939–40, never formally went to Finland’s defense.
As the Finns learned in the Winter War, the world will denounce aggression while not doing anything about it.
Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.
Vaikka olisi kieltämättä halua kirjoitella TurPo aiheista, ja on loma ja kaikki, niin R:va Epämuodikkaita on laittanut minut puutarhahommiin.
Even though one is waiting to get something typed has The Mistress Epämuodikkaita me toiling in the garden with a showel. One is confident that I get something written before August.
As 1st July onwards any reservist in Finland can be called up on “instant notice”, untill this reservists were required to have at least three months of prior notice. This will of course be the regular case from this on as well, but “instant recalls” are meant to be as a way of countering hybrid warfare and as a flexible response tool for heightening security threats in Finland or around Baltic.
Last weekend in 18th and 19th of June we had in Corfu Tour de ski 2016 all the major participants in 8X program where they are to one degree or another. I had the pleasure to be invited into Tour de Sky 2016 By SAAB on Friday. I got to meet and talk with Jan, Magnus and Gideon from the SAAB Gripen program. The SAAB gentlemen were very patient with me asking unfashionable and indescreet questions considering the use of stealth and other things in Gripen program that interest me.
One thing I had in mind was that as they have lengthened the Gripen E’s body and increased her takeoff weight have they also increased the area of the wing? Yes they have, but the wing loading is a bit bigger than with Gripen C/D. But the increase is not dramatic. Will there be a Gripen Growler? Will the jamming capabilities be provided by Swedish or some other party? and so forth. But more of this later.
One thing that really struck me in the Kuopio Rissala Airfield was the difference in size between the EUrofighter and Gripen. When we get to see and ogle around the aeroplanes and see their size, Gripen D’s air speed meter in the nose of the plane was about the same level as my belly button, so Gripen is indeed a small plane.
This enhances her capabilities as a “close in” or WVR fighter because smaller plane is self-evidently much harder to see using just your eyeballs, to get the other plane and to get into the firing position. Swedish pilot giving us a briefing about the Gripen told about this when they have a common practices with the Finnish air force F/A-18 C Hornets. So one might say Gripen is the stealthiest plane of all the HX candidates in WVR and visual light spectrum.
Mrs. Natalie Bakhos from the Dassault Rafale was very kind to me and forthcoming with information about the about the the Rafale program and Rafale for Finland. Dassault had a really nice Pavillion to display on Rafale. But unfortunately there was not a plane itself. But there was a sizeable team of people anwering questions and telling about the fighter, so I had thoroughly nice time with the Rafale team. They also had good selection of goodies for friday, and geve me a photo CD I’ll be putting photos from to this site anytime soonish. Waffle House it quite plain that they have succeeded in making ruffle very cold airplane. it is maybe the hardest of the whole bunch to detect on IRST, or in infrared Spectrum anyway. but I do have my misgivings over will be Spectra system be sufficient in protecting me cut off all fighters in Finish air war situations where good air defense systems and good Fighters a bound. So I’d like to see some kind of a wild weasel or Growler variant over Dassault Rafale. But this might just be me.
British Aerospace or BAE also had Pavillion in place right acroos SAAB’s and they also had two Eurofighter Typhoons on display outside so that one could go around and see the planes close at hand. Two eurofighters present were RAF. The pavillion was not yet in full swing in friday, but I got to meet the team there.
Lockheed Martin had a really nice tent with the really really nice this place in the air show. the good gentleman from there locate Martin even called me and asked me if I want to book that flight simulator time which I have caused it and I would have even had it cost me arm and a leg and one child. Mr. Gary North had a good informative talk and presentation with me and we discussed in some length the problems posed on Finnish Air Force by S-300 S-400 and future S-500 missile systems or let’s say air defense complexes of Russia. It was people and their it don’t to me that stealth is not yet dead as the Russia and China are both developing their own stealth fighters in PAK-FA and the Chinese rip off of F-35 the The Shenyang J-31
So I even got to fly the F-35 flight simulator in the Lockheed-Martin tent and I thoroughly enjoyed myself flew over they never die in 60 meters and bumps on Airfield before I landed on it and the landing was quite amazing as you can imagine because I, with very little or no, landing experience managed to to bring the airplane down in one piece.
What really puzzled me was Boeing’s presence, or lack there off. They didn’t even have a booth of their own. They were hardly there at all,hidden behind a booze restaurant in grounds. So I had to start wondering have they decided, that they will not be able to sell the F/A-18E/F/G to Finland, OR are they so sure of it that they do not even make an effort? Your guess is as good as mine.
Wife has been keeping me rather busy, but I’ll get around to writing about the Tour de Sky in Kuopio. Beautiful fighters were seen and smart and nice people were met. But more of that to come.
In the era of the long war on terror, June 2, 2016, was a tough day for the U.S. military. Two modern jet fighters, a Navy F/A-18 Hornet and an Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon, flown by two of America’s most capable pilots, went down — and one pilot died.
In a war that has featured total dominance of the skies by America’s intrepid aviators and robotic drones, the loss of two finely-tuned fighter jets was a remarkable occurrence.
As it happened, though, those planes weren’t lost in combat. Enemy ground fire or missiles never touched them nor were they taken out in a dogfight with enemy planes — of which, of course, the Islamic State, the Taliban and similar U.S. enemies have none.
Each was part of an elite aerial demonstration team, the Navy’s Blue Angels and the Air Force’s Thunderbirds, respectively. Both were lost to the cause of morale-boosting air shows.
Each briefly grabbed the headlines, only to be quickly forgotten. Americans moved on, content in the knowledge that accidents happen in risky pursuits.
But what does it say about our overseas air wars when the greatest danger American pilots face involves performing aerial hijinks over the friendly skies of “the homeland”?
In fact, it tells us that U.S. pilots currently have not just air superiority or air supremacy, but total mastery of the fabled “high ground” of war. And yet in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere in the Greater Middle East, while the U.S. rules the skies in an uncontested way, America’s conflicts rage on with no endgame in sight.
For all its promise of devastating power delivered against enemies with remarkable precision and quick victories at low cost — at least to Americans — air power has failed to deliver, not just in the ongoing war on terror but for decades before it.
If anything, by providing an illusion of results, it has helped keep the United States in unwinnable wars, while inflicting a heavy toll on innocent victimson our distant battlefields.
At the same time, the cult-like infatuation of American leaders, from the president on down, with the supposed ability of the U.S. military to deliver such results remains remarkably unchallenged in Washington.
A World War I-vintage U.S. Army Air Corps biplane. U.S. Army photo
America’s experience with air power
Since World War II, even when the U.S. military has enjoyed total mastery of the skies, the end result has repeatedly been stalemate or defeat. Despite this, U.S. leaders continue to send in the warplanes. To understand why, a little look at the history of air power is in order.
In the aftermath of World War I, with its grim trench warfare and horrific killing fields, early aviators like Giulio Douhet of Italy, Hugh Trenchard of Britain and Billy Mitchell of the United States imagined air power as the missing instrument of decision.
It was, they believed, the way that endless ground war and the meat grinder of the trenches that went with it could be avoided in the future. Unfortunately for those they inspired, in World War II the skies simply joined the land and the seas as yet another realm of grim attrition, death and destruction.
In World War II, the U.S. Army Air Forces joined Britain’s Royal Air Force in a “combined bomber offensive” against Nazi Germany. A bitter battle of attrition with Germany’s air force, the Luftwaffe, ensued. Allied aircrews suffered crippling losses until air superiority was finally achieved early in 1944 during what would be dubbed the “Big Week.”
A year later, the Allies had achieved air supremacy and were laying waste to Germany’s cities — as they would to Japan’s — although even then they faced formidable systems of ground fire as well as elite Luftwaffe pilots in the world’s first jet fighters. At war’s end, Allied losses in aircrews had been staggering, but few doubted that those crews had contributed immeasurably to the defeat of the Nazis, as well as the Japanese.
Thanks to air power’s successes in World War II — though they were sometimes exaggerated — in 1947 the Air Force gained its independence from the Army and became a service in its own right. By then, the enemy was communism, and air power advocates like Gen. Curtis LeMay were calling for the creation of a strategic air command made up of long-range bombers armed with city-busting thermonuclear weapons.
The strategy of that moment, nuclear “deterrence” via the threat of “massive retaliation,” later morphed into “mutually assured destruction,” better known by its telling acronym, MAD.
SAC never dropped a nuclear bomb in anger, though its planes did drop a few by accident. Fortunately for humanity, none exploded. Naturally, when the U.S. “won” the Cold War, the Air Force took much of the credit for having contained the Soviet bear behind a thermonuclear-charged fence.
Frustration first arrived full-blown in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. Primitive, rugged terrain and an enemy that went deep underground blunted the effectiveness of bombing. Flak and fighters — Soviet MiGs — inflicted significant losses on Allied aircrews, while U.S. air powerdevastated North Korea, dropping 635,000 tons of bombs, the equivalent in explosive yield of 40 Hiroshima bombs, as well as 32,557 tons of napalm, leveling its cities and hitting its dams.
Yet widespread bombing and near total air superiority did nothing to resolve the stalemate on the ground that led to an unsatisfying truce and a Korea that remains bitterly divided to this day.
The next round of frustration came in the country’s major conflicts in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and early 1970s. American air power bombed, strafed, and sprayed with defoliants virtually everything that moved — and much that didn’t — in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
A staggering seven million tons of bombs, the equivalent in explosive yield to more than 450 Hiroshimas, were dropped in the name of defeating communism. An area equivalent in size to Massachusetts was poisoned with defoliants meant to strip cover from the dense vegetation and jungle of South Vietnam, poison that to this day brings death and disfigurement to Vietnamese.
The North Vietnamese, with modest ground-fire defenses, limited surface-to-air missiles and a few fighter jets, were hopelessly outclassed in the air. Nonetheless, just as in Korea, widespread American bombing and air superiority, while generating plenty of death and destruction, didn’t translate into victory.
Fast-forward 20 years to Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991, and then to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In both cases, U.S. and coalition air forces had not just air superiority but air supremacy as each time the Iraqi air force fled or was otherwise almost instantly neutralized, along with the bulk of that country’s air defenses.
Yet for all the hype that followed about “precision bombing” and “shock and awe,” no matter how air power was applied, events on the ground proved stubbornly resistant to American designs. Saddam Hussein survived Desert Storm to bedevil U.S. leaders for another dozen years.
After the 2003 invasion with its infamous “mission accomplished” moment, Iraq degenerated into insurgency and civil war, aggravated by the loss of critical infrastructure like electrical generating plants, which U.S. air power had destroyed in the opening stages of the invasion. Air supremacy over Iraq led not to long-lasting victory but to an ignominious U.S. withdrawal in 2011.
Now, consider the “war on terror,” preemptively announced by Pres. George W. Bush in 2001 and still going strong 15 years later. Whether the target’s been Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Al Shabab, Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula or, more recently, the Islamic State, from the beginning U.S. air power enjoyed almost historically unprecedented mastery of the skies.
Yet despite this “asymmetric” advantage, despite all the bombing, missile strikes, and drone strikes, “progress” proved both “fragile” and endlessly “reversible” — to use words Gen. David Petraeus applied to his “surges” in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In fact, 12,000 or so strikes after Washington’s air war against ISIS in Syria and Iraq began in August 2014, we now know that intelligence estimates of its success had to be deliberately exaggerated by the military to support a conclusion that bombing and missile strikes were effective ways to do in the Islamic State.
So here we are, in 2016, 25 years after Desert Storm and nearly a decade after the Petraeus “surge” in Iraq that purportedly produced that missing mission accomplished moment for Washington — and U.S. air assets are again in action in Iraqi and now Syrian skies.
They are, for instance, flying ground support missions for Iraqi forces as they attempt to retake Falluja, a city in Al Anbar province that had already been “liberated” in 2004 at a high cost to U.S. ground troops and an even higher one to Iraqi civilians. Thoroughly devastated back then, Fallujah has again found itself on the receiving end of American air power.
If and when Iraqi forces do retake the city, they may inherit little more than bodies and rubble, as they did in taking the city of Ramadi last December. About Ramadi, Patrick Cockburn noted last month that “more than 70 percent of its buildings are in ruins and the great majority of its 400,000 people are still displaced.”
American drones, meanwhile, continue to soar over foreign skies, assassinating various terrorist “kingpins” to little permanent effect.
U.S. Army Air Corps B-17s drop bombs during World War II. U.S. Army photo
Tell me how this ends
Something’s gone terribly wrong with Washington’s soaring dreams of air power and what it can accomplish. And yet the urge to loose the planes only grows stronger among America’s political class.
Given the frustratingly indecisive results of U.S. air campaigns in these years, one might wonder why a self-professed smart guy like Ted Cruz, when still a presidential candidate, would have called for “carpet bombing” our way to victory over ISIS, and yet in these years he has been more the norm than the exception in his infatuation with air power.
Everyone from Donald Trump to Pres. Barack Obama has looked to the air for the master key to victory. In 2014, even Petraeus, home from the wars, declared himself “all in” on more bombing as critical to victory — whatever that word might now mean — in Iraq.
Only recently, he also called for the loosing of American air power, yet again, in Afghanistan — not long after which Obama did just that.
Even as air power keeps the U.S. military in the game, even as it shows results — terror leaders killed, weapons destroyed, oil shipments interdicted and so on — even as it thrills politicians in Washington, that magical victory over the latest terror outfits remains elusive.
That is, in part, because air power by definition never occupies ground. It can’t dig in. It can’t swim like Mao Zedong’s proverbial fish in the sea of “the people.” It can’t sustain persuasive force. Its force is always staccato and episodic.
Its suasion, such as it is, comes from killing at a distance. But its bombs and missiles, no matter how “smart,” often miss their intended targets. Intelligence and technology regularly prove themselves imperfect or worse, which means that the deaths of innocents are inevitable. This ensures new recruits for the very organizations the planes are intent on defeating and new cycles of revenge and violence amid the increasing vistas of rubble below.
Even when the bombs are on target, as happens often enough, and a terrorist leader or “lieutenant” is eliminated, what then? You kill a dozen more? As Petraeus said in a different context — tell me how this ends.
A U.S. Air Force A-10 fires its gun during a training exercise. U.S. Air Force photo
Recalling the warbirds
From Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama, dropping bombs and firing missiles has been the presidentially favored way of “doing something” against an enemy. Air power is, in a sense, the easiest thing for a president to resort to and, in our world, has the added allure of the high-tech.
It looks good back home. Not only does the president not risk the lives of American troops, he rarely risks retaliation of any kind.
Whether our presidents know it or not, however, air power always comes with hidden costs, starting with the increasingly commonplace blowback of retaliatory terrorist strikes on “soft” targets — meaning people — in cities like Paris or Madrid or London.
Strikes that target senior members of enemy armies or terrorist organizations often miss, simply stoking yet more of the sorts of violent behavior we are trying to eradicate with our own version of violence.
When they don’t miss and the leadership of terror groups is hit, as Cockburn has shown, the result is often the emergence of even more radical and brutal leaders and the further spread of such movements.
In addition, U.S. air power, especially the White House-run drone assassination program, is leading the way globally when it comes to degrading the sovereignty of national borders.
Witness the latest drone strike against the head of the Taliban in violation ofPakistani air space. Right now, Washington couldn’t care less about this, but it is pioneering a future that, once taken up by other powers, may look far less palatable to American politicians.
Despite the sorry results delivered by air power over the last 65 years, the U.S. military continues to invest heavily in it — not only in drones but also in ultra-expensive fighters and bombers like the disappointing F-35 and the Air Force’s latest, already redundant long-range strike bomber.
Dismissing the frustratingly mixed and often destabilizing results that come from air strikes, disregarding the jaw-dropping prices of the latest fighters and bombers, America’s leaders continue to clamor for yet more warplanes and yet more bombing.
And isn’t there a paradox, if not a problem, in the very idea of winning a war on terror through what is in essence terror bombing? Though it’s not something that, for obvious reasons, is much discussed in this country, given the historical record it’s hard to deny that bombing is terror.
After all, that’s why early aviators like Douhet and Mitchell embraced it. They believed it would be so terrifyingly effective that future wars would be radically shortened to the advantage of those willing and able to bomb.
As it turned out, what air power provided was not victory, but carnage, terror, rubble — and resistance.
Americans should have a visceral understanding of why populations under our bombs and missiles resist. They should know what it means to be attacked from the air, how it pisses you off, how it generates solidarity, how it leads to new resolve and vows of vengeance.
Forget Pearl Harbor, where my uncle, then in the Army, dodged Japanese bombs on Dec. 7, 1941. Think about 9/11. On that awful day in 2001, the United States was “bombed” by hijacked jet liners transformed into guided missiles.
Our skies became deadly. A technology indelibly associated with American inventiveness and prowess was turned against us. Colossally shocked, America vowed vengeance.
Are our enemies any less resolutely human than we are? Like us, they’re not permanently swayed by bombing. They vow vengeance when friends, family members, associates of every sort are targeted. When American “smart” bombs obliterate wedding parties and other gatherings overseas, do we think the friends and loved ones of the dead shrug and say, “That’s war”?
We didn’t.
Having largely overcome the trauma of 9/11, Americans today look to the sky with hope. We watch the Blue Angels and Thunderbirds with a sense of awe, wonder, and pride. Warplanes soar over our sports stadiums. The sky is our high ground. We see evidence of America’s power and ingenuity there.
Yet people in Afghanistan Iraq, and elsewhere often pray for clouds and bad weather. For them, clear skies are associated with American-made death from above.
It’s time we allow other peoples to look skyward with that same sense of safety and hope as we normally do. It’s time to recall the warbirds. They haven’t provided solutions. Indeed, the terror, destruction, and resentments they continue to spread are part of the problem.
Googletin tuossa aamulla huvikseni mitä Yle on kirjoittanut EU komission hyvin epäsuosittusta ampuma-ase direktiivistä. Näyttää, että vuodenvaihteen 2016 jälkeen asiasta ei YLEllä ole tiedetty mitään. Onko Ylellä tässä asiassa on tiedotuskielto vai katsooko Yle parhaaksi olla nostamatta EU kriittisyyttä asiasta. Epäilen että tämä jyrisevä hiljaisuus johtuu Len agendasta, eli piilotavoitteesta. Yle jo on “laadukkaan tiedonvälityksen linjalla” kuitenkin katsonut parhaaksi pimittää ampuma-asedirektiivi asian suomalaisilta, pääasiassa metsästäjiltä ja reserviläisiltä. Luultavasti, koska Yle on valinnut tiedotuslinjakseen aseiden vaarallaisuuden, mikä kävi ilmi Vihdin tapahtumien ympärillä, ja koska MEP Jussi Halla-aho on tehnyt kiitettävää työtä tätä täysin järjetöntä EU direktiiviä vastaan.
Luettuani muutamia Ylen juttuja ampuma-ase lainsäädännöstä, ampuma-aseista ja yleistä turvallisuudesta olen huomannut että Ylellä on selkeä agenda tässä asiassa: Yle ajaa Suomessa aselainsäädännön tiukentamista ja muokkaa yleistä mielipidettä asevastaisemmaksi. Tämä käy erittäin selvästi ilmi siinä, kuinka Yle valitsee “asiantuntijansa”. Tässä kohtaa kannattaa huomata, että “asiantuntija” on kuka tahansa jota sanotaan “asiantuntijaksi”. Edelleen Yle on osoittanut mielihalunsa haastatella toisia toimittajia ja vielä nimenomaan niin että Ylen agenda toteutuu. Media siis haastattelee mediaa yhteiskunnallisista asioista. Eikö haastateltavia löydy toimijoista, jos katsojia pitää haastatella? No linkkaamassani jutussa oli löydetty asiantuntijaksi asevastaisuudestaan kuuluisa ylitarkastaja Reima Pensala. Reiman edesottamuksista voit lukaista vaikkapa TÄÄLTÄ.
EU-komissio haluaa palata pimeälle keskiajalle ja palauttaa maaorjat, siis sinut ja minut, takaisin turvalliseksi tuotantoeläimeksi. Tämä tarkoittaa tietenkin sitä, että veronalaisella rahvaalla ei ole enää kykyä vastustaa EU eliitin järjettömyyksiä. EUn palatsieunukit, ja Jyrki Katainen, joka profiloitui myös metsästäjänä, haluavat pönkittää omaa valtaansa uutena virka-aatelina. Tämän takia Britannian mallia mahdollisimman hyvin mukaillen rahvaalta ampuma-aseet pois. Linkitän tähän firearms Unitedin viimeisen tiedotteen asiasta. Tässä tiedotteessa kävi ilmi että kaikki lippaat halutaan saattaa luvanvaraisiksi aseen osiksi. Tämä on äärimmäisen outoa, tyhmää ja jopa mahdotonta, koskapa esimerkiksi keskiverto SRA ampujalla on lippaita toistakymmentä kappaletta. Tähän asti lippaat ovat olleet täysin lupavapaita niistä ei ole viimeisen 50 vuoden ajalta minkäänlaista rekisteriä, on aika mahdotonta saada näitä kymmeniä tuhansia lippaita rekisteriin.
Mutta takaisin Yleen: Seurattuani Ylen asedirektiivi uutisointia en voi mitenkään pitää Yleä “puolueettomana ja laadukkaana mediana”. Ylellä on agenda, jota se surutta ajaa hyväuskoisille Ylen käyttäjille. Tässä käy erittäin hyvin ilmi toimittajien poliittiset suuntaukset sekä vihervasemmistolainen pyrkimys hallita tiedonkulkua ja sitä kautta pyrkiä ujuttamaan huomaamatta ihmisten ohi järjetöntä ja epäsuhtaista lainsäädäntöä. En väitä että mv-sivusto olisi “puolueeton” tai “hyvä tiedonlähde”, mutta on tuskallisen selvää, että Yle ei myöskään sellainen ole.
Mitähän muuta Yle yrittää uittaa ohi meidän huomaamattamme?
Israeli strategist Martin van Creveld is one of the most interesting and engaging writers on the subject (surprisingly, most of the people who read him back in the 80s didn’t have any idea he was Israeli, not that it matters). Van Creveld has a seldom updated blog, and when he does update it, it’s very,…
Ilmeisesti reblogin reblog. Kannattaa lukea, ja miettiä Ahvenanmaata. SEN tilanne on vielä huonompi kuin Gotlannin.
Few, if any, military or political observers saw Russia’s swift occupation and annexation of Crimea coming. Reeling from the shock of slaughter on Institutskaya Street and struggling to interpret t…
Suomessa ollaan, ilmeisesti Stalin muiston kunnioittamiseksi, aina pitäydytty kuudessäkymmenessä hävittäjässä. Käsittelen tässä Pariisin rauhansopimuksen 1947 (Stalinin Neuvostoliiton ) asettamia ehtoja Suomen puolustusvoimille.( Ja kyllä olen tietoinen, että näitä ehtoja on useaan kertaan muutettu, mutta” tärkeimmät” rajoitteet ovat jostain syystä edelleen voimassa.) Lisää voit vilkaista Wikipediasta
Eli, Silloin kun Punainen Tähti™ oli valttia, katsoi NL, että noin kuudellakymmenellä koneella on helppo pyyhkiä tarvittaessa pöytää. Määrä oli tietenkin naurettavan vähäinen 1940 luvun lopulla, koska se ei ole tänäkään päivänä riittävä. Tämä avasi Neuvotoliitolla mahdollisuuden käyttää Suomen, erityisesti Lapin, ilmatilaa niinkuin halusi.Kylmän sodan kovimmilla pakkasilla Ruotsilla oli maailman viidenneksi vahvimmat, noin 500 koneen ilmavoimat. Olen taipuvainen luottamaan silloisten ruotsalaisten suunnittelijoiden laskupäähän, joka laittaisi maan koon ja asukasmäärä huomioiden Suomen ilmavoimien “oikean” mitoituksen noin 200-260 koneeseen.
Eli Suomen ilmavoimat olivat noin 200 konetta liian pienet. Tätä kierrettiin sillä tavalla, että Suomi koulutti huomattavasti liikaa lentäjiä erityisesti Draken kalustoon, ja ruotsi kaikessa hiljaisuudessa varastoi ylijäämä Drakeneita suomalaisille siirrettäväksi sodan sattuessa. Kun Suomi vaihtoi Hornet kalustoon ja kylmässä sodassa tuli suojakelit, purkivat ruotsalaiset varastonsa.
Ilmavoimien koko ja koneiden hinta on 1970 luvulta noussut. Koneiden ominaisuudet ovat tietenkin myös moninkertaisesti parantuneet, samoinkuin ohjusten, ainakin periaatteellinen, kantama. Tietenkin länsikoneiden ja itäkoneiden suhteellinen ero on kaventunut, ja on myös ajatuksia, että itäkalusto on mennyt länsikaluston edelle. Aerodynaamisesti tämä pitääkin paikkaansa, avioniikasta en ole taipuvainen sanomaan ainakaan vielä mitään. Siis tärkeää ei ole, esimerkiksi, JAS-39E/F/G Gripenin kyvykkyys suhteessa J-35F Drakeniin, vaan TÄRKEÄÄ on HX koneen kyvyt suhteessa SU-27/30/37 sarjaan tai PAK-FA koneeseen ja sen omianisuuksiin.
Teknillis-taloudellisesti sekä Suomen ala ja avaruus sekä koneiden nopeus sekä huoltosyklit/huoltointensiivisyys huomioiden “oikea” määrä hävittäjiä suomessa olisi noin 100. 80 hävittäjää, 10 kaksipaikkaista yleiskonetta sekä noin 20 SEAD optimoitua konetta.
Siis kehotan huomaamaan, että “60 hävittäjää” perustuu Isä Aurinkoisen™ ajatukselle siitä mitä olisi helppo tuhota, mutta on kuitenkin jonkinmoinen viikunanlehti aseettomuuden suojana.
HX ohjelmassa on puhuttu paljon häive, eli stealth, koneista ja tekniikasta. Vaikka 1980 luvulla F-117 Nighthawk oli lähes näkymätön, ja pesi 1991 Irakin Kari ilmatorjuntajärjestelmän menne tullen ja palatessa, onnistuivat Serbit ampumaan koneen alas käyttäen itseasiassa vielä vanhempaa tekniikkaa ja vähän aivoja maaliskuussa 1999. Niinsanottu “stealt fighter” oli vain yhden tempun taikuri, ja siksi se vedettiin pois käytöstä 2008. Kone suunniteltiin nimenomaan 1970 luvulla yleistyneitä mikrometritutkia vastaan. Hauska yksityiskohta tässä jutussa on, että teoreettisen viitekehyksen antoi neuvostoliittolainen fyysikko Pyotr Yakovlevich Ufimtsev, lasertutkija. Hänen työtään Radiotekniikan koulussa ei pidetty sotilaallisesti tai taloudellisesti tärkeänä, ja hän sai julkaista tutkimuksensa radioaaltojen käyttäytymisestä kappaleiden rajapinnassa ulkomaille. Lockheedin insinöörit saivat tästä viitekehyksen, jolla he kehittelivät sitten häivetekniikkaa.
Ufimtsevin tutkimus siis kuivaili radioaaltojen liikettä esineiden rajapinnassa, ja huomasi että niinkään tärkeää ei ole esineen koko, vaan mihin suuntaan se heijastaa siihen osuneet radioaallot. Tietenkin esineen koolla ja myös materiaalilla on merkityksensä, mutta tärkein asia on muotoilu. Erityisen pahoja ovat suuret toisiinsa 90º kulmassa olevat, esimerkiksi siivet ja pystyvakaajat, laajat pinnat. Ne heijastavat säteilyn erehtymättä takaisin lähettäjälleen. Siksi koneet ovat eri suunnista tarkastellessa hyvinkin pieniheijasteisia tai suuriheijasteisia. Tämä jatkumo menee koko koneen ympäsi oikealta vasemmalle 360 astetta SEKÄ edestä yläkautta taakse ja alakautta takaisin 360 astetta. Niinsanoakseme pallona koneen ympärillä. Kuva otettu http://s619.photobucket.com/user/SpudmanWP/media/2b1a549e.jpg.htmlkuva on demonstraatiotarkoituksessa, ja en väitä sen kuvaavan minkään yksittäisen lentokoneen Radar Cross Sectionia eli RCSää. Valitsin kuvan, koska siihen oli hahmoteltu eri taajuuksilla toimivien tutkien aihuttamia muutoksia RCSään. Kuten huomaamme, suoraan sivuille tämä kone antaa erittäin kauniin ja voimakkaan kaiun. Edestä sensijaan kaiku vaimenee voimakkaasti. Hauska juttu sinänsä vielä nykyhävittäjissä, että niiden tutka, vaikkei se olisi päälläkään, tarjoaa erittäin tasaisen ja kauniin heijastavan pinnan naapurin tutkan heijastua takaisin. Siksi tuossa edellämainitussa F-117A koneessa ei ollut tutkaa ollenkaan.
Hienosti tämä muotilu näkyy US Navyn Zumvalt luokan hävittäjissä, jotka ovat erittäin kulmikkaita ja erikoisen näköisiä aluksia. Myös aseistus on sijoitettu mahdollisimman pitkälle kuoriin, jotka estävä näiden 90 heijastuspintojen syntymisen.
F-35 JSF ei ole amerikkaisten mukaan häivekone, se on “low observable aircraft” eli suurinpiirtein vaikeasti havaittava lentokone. USAF määrityksen mukaan vain F-22 Raptor on häivekone, mutta sitä ei olla myymässä edes läheisimmille liittolaisille. Siksi esimerkiksi Japani on aloittanut oman häivekone ohjelmansa. Raptoria ei valmisteta enää, vaan se on ennenpitkää poistuvaa kalustoa. Mitsubishi Shinsin on “tekninen demo” vaiheessa. Wikipediassa aiheesta TÄÄLLÄ.
Myös muissa HX ohjelman koneissa on pyritty tutkavasteen pienentämiseen, mutta ei, kuten JSFn tapauksessa, kaikkien muiden ominaisuuksien kustannuksella. Muunmuassa F-18E/F/G tarjoaa mahdollisuutta sijoittaa aseistusta runkoon kiinnitettävään gondoliin, jolloin heijastukset pienenevät paljon. SAAB puhuu E-stealth konseptista, jossa, ilmeisesti omalla tutkalla, lähetetään sopivaan aikaan sopivalla aaltomuodolla olevia pulsseja. Tällä, ainakin teoriassa, voidaan vaimentaan tulevaa tutkasingnaalia.
Edelleen esimerkiksi venäläisen S-400 järjestelmän (NATO nimellä SA-21 Growler) noin 3 GHz taajuuden desimetri alueen tutka. Siis aallonpituus on noin 10cm, Tämä mahdollistaa juurikin häivekoneiden havaitsemisen, koska aallonpituus on niin pitkä, että se ei heijastu takaisin koneen pinnasta (paksuus max millimetrejä), vaan koneen sisärakenteista. 0,9GHz alapuolella RCS alkaa kasvaa ekspotentiaalisesti, joten oikeastaan vaikeutena on tehdä niinhuono vastaanotin, että kaikkea pientä ei havaita ilmasta. Vieläkin matalemmilla taajuuksilla olisi edelleen parempi havaitsemiskyky, mutta Mhz alueilla toimii jos jonkinlaista siviili ja muuta lähetintä, että avaruus on tukossa.
Kuitenkin tietokoneella avustettuna S-400 tutka antaa valvontakuvaa, jonka perusteella voidaan ainakin aavistella mistäpäin häivekonetta olisi tulossa. Oikeastaan vaikeutena on jo se, että havainnointikyky on liian hyvä. Jo pilvetkin voidaan havaita riittävän alhaisen taajuuden tutkilla, mutta silloin alkaa tutka havaita jo niinpaljon tavaraa, että jyvien erottelu akanoista vaatii jo paljon laskutehoa järjestelmän tietokoneilta. Lentokoneissa ei näitä tutkia voida käyttää, koska antennikoko kasvaa niin suureksi, että semmoista ei voi lentokoneeseen mahduttaa. Ajatellaampa vaikka saksalaisten yöhävittäjien tutka-antenneja, ne olivat niin suuria ja vastustivat ilmavirtaa niin pahasti, että koneiden huippunopeudet putosivat 50-100km/h. Lukaista voi vaikkapa saksalaisesta tutkasta. Havaitsisi muuten F-35 aika hyvin, eri asia sitten mitä voisi sille tehdä.
Mutta siis valvontatutkalla voidaan ohjata tulenjohtotutkat seuraamaan mielenkiintoisia alueita, jolloin tutkittavan tilavuuden valtavuus ei ole enään haaste. Edelleen kun yhtälöön liitetään IRST ja muita infrapuna sensoreita, voidaan koneen jättämä lämpöjälki nähdä kylmää avaruutta vasten, vaikkei muuta nähtäisikään. Kun kahdelta tai kolmelta infrapunasensorilta saadaan suuntatietoja ja niiden oma paikkatieto, on jokaiselle pythagoraan lauseensa opetelleelle ysiluokkalaiselle pikkujuttu laskea koneen koordinaatit. Tietokone tekee sen reaaliajassa, jolloin voidaan ruveta jo ohjuksiakin poksuttelemaan sopivaan suuntaan.
Kaikissa hävittäjissä on suihkumoottorit, jotka ovat kuumina kohteina helposti havaittavissa jopa yli 100km päästä. F-35 koneella on tässäsuhteessa sellainen ongelma, että sen ainoa suihkumoottori joutuu tekemään paljon töitä pitääkseen “liian raskaan” koneen ilmassa, joten se käy hyvin kuumana, ja on siten helpommin kuin esimerkiksi JAS-39 Gripen, havaittavissa IRST järjestelmällä kaukaa.
Tutkat voidaan vielä rakentaa multistaattisiksi,eli monikeskiöisiksi, jolloin nuo ensimäisessä kuvassa näkyvät “piikit” tulevat hyvin merkityksellisiksi: Kun tyhmä säteilijä on keskellä ja vasntaanottajat mikä missäkin, ei häivekone voi suunnitella sellaista reittiä kohteelle, että se tietäisi että se ei missään olosuhteissa heijasta energiaa tutkan suuntaan, ja tule havaituksi. Säteilijä on helppo tuhota, mutta niin halpa, että sen tuhoaminen ei oikeastaan ole ohjuksen käyttämisen väärttiä (ainakaan hinnaltaan), ja kun yksi on tuhottu, niin käynnistetään kilometrin päässä toinen, ja sama peli jatkuu.
Ilmavoimienkaan ei siis kannata pelkkään häivetekniikkaan hirttäytyä.
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